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Abstract 
The measurement issue is the key issue in the literature on trade policy-induced agri-
cultural price incentive bias. This paper introduces a general equilibrium effective 
rate of protection (GE-ERP) measure, which extends and generalizes earlier partial 
equilibrium nominal protection measures. For the 15 sample countries, the results 
indicate that the agricultural price incentive bias, which was generally perceived to 
exist during the 1980s, was largely eliminated during the 1990s. The results also 
demonstrate that general equilibrium effects and country-specific characteristics – 
including trade shares and intersectoral linkages – are crucial for determining the 
sign and magnitude of trade policy bias. The GE-ERP measure is therefore uniquely 
suited to capture the full impact of trade policies on agricultural price incentives. A 
Monte Carlo procedure confirms that the results are robust with respect to tradability 
assumptions. JEL codes: D58, O10, Q18. 
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1. Introduction 
“Getting prices right” was a rallying call when developing countries started re-
orienting their economic policies in the early 1980s. Trade and macroeconomic poli-
cies were generally perceived to favor urban industry over agricultural production. 
The existence of an incentive bias against agriculture was affirmed in the late 1980s 
by a major World Bank research project carried out under the general direction of 
Anne O. Krueger (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés, 1988; Krueger, 1992; Schiff and 
Valdés, 1992; and Bautista and Valdés, 1993).1 The country-studies relied on partial 
equilibrium analysis and measures of nominal protection rates (NPRs), with little at-
tention to intersectoral linkages, degrees of tradability, and feedback effects from 
changes in incomes and relative prices. Based on data from the early 1960s to the 
mid-1980s, they concluded that reductions in trade distortions, in many developing 
countries, would reduce the incentive bias against agriculture, improve agricultural 
performance, increase export earnings, and contribute to economic growth. This line 
of reasoning has continued to play an influential role in the thinking about the way in 
which economic policy affects incentives and economic growth in developing coun-
tries (Krueger, 1998; Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 2001). 
 
More recently, issues such as food security and rural development have been raised in 
WTO and regional trade negotiations. This shift has lead to a renewed interest in 
measuring price incentives and policy bias in agriculture (Anderson, 2007). Relative 
price incentives and policy bias are inherently general equilibrium issues. The adop-
tion of a general equilibrium methodology to measure policy-induced incentive bias 
has been facilitated, over the past decade, by the increased availability of economy-
wide data sets in the form of Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs). The Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) at Purdue University has e.g. developed a large scale trade-
focused SAM data base to support the use of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models for global trade policy analysis. World Bank researchers have recently used 
the GTAP data base to revisit the issue of whether there exists a trade policy bias 
against poor agricultural farm households in developing countries. In a number of pa-
pers, Anderson et al. (2005, 2006a, 2006b) employ the dynamically recursive global 
computable general equilibrium LINKAGE model to study the effects of trade liber-
alization on developing countries. They find that “developing country agricultural 
production, employment and real net income would increase” with trade liberaliza-
                                                 
1 This discussion formed part of a broader debate about development strategy and “urban bias”. The 
existence of a pro-urban, anti-agricultural bias had been widely accepted since the seminal contribu-
tion by Lipton (1977). 
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tion. In addition, they hypothesize that “individual model simulations … may well get 
that result also” (Anderson et al., 2006a).2 
 
To complement their global analyses, a new World Bank project on Distortions to 
Agricultural Incentives, under the direction of Kym Anderson, is revisiting the debate 
about agricultural price incentives through country case studies. This project aims at 
exploring (i) the extent of price distortions, (ii) the causes of underlying policy 
choices, and (iii) the consequences of resulting price distortions. The methodology is 
similar in spirit to Krueger’s project from the 1980s, but will extend that analysis to a 
wider set of less developed and transition economies (48 country studies). While the 
country studies rely on partial equilibrium analyses and nominal protection measures, 
they will be accompanied by “a CGE-based empirical analysis … to get a better 
global picture” as noted by Anderson (2007). The World Bank researchers have, in 
their previous CGE-based studies, focused on dynamically recursive analyses of wel-
fare effects. This type of dynamic policy impact analysis is common in the CGE lit-
erature. However, it does not provide a clean measure of policy bias. 
 
In contrast, the current study will employ a static single-country CGE model method-
ology, which will allow for clean measurement of policy-induced price incentive bias. 
The single-country CGE model methodology allows for tailoring models to incorpo-
rate the full range of country-specific distorting taxes and subsidies on both traded 
and non-traded goods. In addition, the methodology makes it possible to take account 
of intersectoral linkages, varying degrees of tradability, and feedback effects from 
relative price changes in the measurement of policy bias. As a consequence, the 
methodology allows us to move beyond the calculation of nominal protection rates, 
and calculate a general equilibrium based effective rate of protection (GE-ERP) 
measure. With the current study, we aim to clarify how the choice of methodology 
and protection measure affects the measurement of trade policy-induced price incen-
tive bias. The results indicate that the use of partial equilibrium based nominal protec-
tion measures is problematic. Accounting for intersectoral linkages and general equi-
librium effects turns out to be crucial for measuring the size and sign of the policy 
bias. It follows that a general equilibrium based effective protection measure is neces-
sary to capture the full extent of policy bias. 
                                                 
2 The World Bank researchers also note that that “terms of trade effects of reforms by others are 
usually dominated by efficiency gains from own reforms except for the least-protected economies” 
(Anderson et al.; 2006b). This implies that changes in foreign tariffs and relative world market pri-
ces are of secondary importance, and casts doubt on the necessity of using a global CGE model. 
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Our analytical approach is to develop and apply static single-country CGE models, in 
order to derive GE-ERP measures of trade policy-induced agricultural price incen-
tives. The CGE model framework will be used as a measuring device rather than a 
tool for policy analysis. We apply the methodology to our sample of 15 developing 
countries, with the aim to study (1) the historical variation of protection rates which 
arise from existing trade policy distortions, and (2) the experimental variation in pro-
tection rates which arises from imposing standard trade policy distortions on non-
distorted base economies. A Monte Carlo procedure, based on variation in trade elas-
ticities, is employed to provide a robustness check on the results. Further background 
on protection measures and modeling methodology is presented in Section 2; country 
models and data sets are summarized in Section 3; results of the various simulations 
and robustness checks are reviewed in Section 4; and conclusions are offered in Sec-
tion 5. 
2. Measuring Policy Incentive Bias 
2.1. Partial Equilibrium Measures 
To quantify the impact of trade policy regimes on relative agricultural price incen-
tives, the original World Bank project from the late 1980s studied a representative 
group of 18 developing countries.3 They distinguished between direct and indirect 
policy measures affecting agricultural price incentives. Direct policy measures were 
defined to include all measures, which affected the wedge between agricultural pro-
ducer and border prices directly. These measures typically included domestic agricul-
tural taxes and subsidies, export taxes on cash crops, and import tariffs on food crops. 
Indirect policy measures were defined as economy-wide measures affecting the dif-
ference between relative agricultural producer and border prices, and can be classified 
under two main headings: (i) industrial protection policies, and (ii) overvaluation of 
the exchange rate. Industrial protection measures include industrial import tariffs and 
quotas, as well as domestic industrial taxes and subsidies. The overvaluation of the 
exchange rate was measured by the depreciation required to eliminate the non-
sustainable part of the current account deficit, plus the exchange rate impact of other 
trade policy interventions.  
 
                                                 
3 Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1988), and Schiff and Valdés (1992) will henceforth be referred to as 
KSV and SV. 
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The quantification of direct and indirect effects of domestic tax and trade policies on 
agricultural price incentives was primarily based on the computation of nominal pro-
tection rates (NPRs). The total NPR for a given traded agricultural product was de-
fined as the proportional difference between (i) the ratio of the agricultural producer 
price and a non-agricultural producer price index, and (ii) the ratio between the agri-
cultural border price and a non-agricultural border price index, both measured at the 
equilibrium exchange rate. The study by KSV, which covered the period 1975-84, 
presented NPRs for one agricultural tradable good from each of the 18 countries in 
their sample. They concluded that nominal protection was negative for all types of 
(traded) agricultural goods. The SV study included the same sample of 18 countries, 
but extended the period of coverage to 1960-84 and generalized the results by extend-
ing the number of agricultural goods. Their results were qualitatively similar to those 
of KSV.  
 
Based on the assumption that all agricultural goods are traded, KSV and SV argued 
that their results (for the chosen set of goods) were representative for the overall agri-
cultural sector. The SV study did recognize that “…traded products have non-tradable 
components, including some distribution and marketing costs.” Yet, no attempt was 
made to take account of these non-tradable components or of any qualitative differ-
ences from world market goods. Moreover, while KSV used nominal protection as 
their measure of relative price distortion, they acknowledged that a more appropriate 
measure would be the effective rate of protection (ERP), which also takes distortions 
in input prices into account. However, “Due mainly to data inadequacy…” their study 
contains no results on ERPs. 
 
The methodology of the new World Bank project on Distortions to Agricultural In-
centives is in line with the KSV and SV studies. Accordingly, the outline of the new 
project states that “The empirical estimates will build on the pioneering work to the 
mid-1980s by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes … although the methodology will differ a 
little…” (Anderson et al., 2008). The new project relies on the Relative Rate of Assis-
tance (RRA) measure. The RRA measure is similar to the NPR measure in the sense 
that both measures are nominal protection measures.4 The new World Bank project 
also inherits the partial equilibrium methodology of the KSV and SV studies. The 
World Bank researchers do acknowledge the need to account for general equilibrium 
effects in the measurement of the full impact of trade distortions. Nevertheless, they 
                                                 
4 Moreover, the RRA and NPR measures are both indicators of relative agricultural vs. non-
agricultural price incentives, and both measures focus on the relative difference between domestic 
and border prices. 
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explain that the reason for the exclusion of so-called “flow-on consequences” is that 
“if the direct distortions are accurately estimated, they can be incorporated into an ap-
propriate country or global economy-wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model which in turn will be able to capture the full general equilibrium impacts … of 
the various direct distortions …” (Anderson et al., 2008). Accordingly, the new World 
Bank project does not aim to measure the full extent of trade distortions and policy 
bias. 
2.2.  General Equilibrium Measures 
Past and current World Bank projects have employed a partial equilibrium methodol-
ogy for estimating nominal agricultural protection measures based on relative output 
prices. In contrast, we employ a general equilibrium methodology for estimating ef-
fective protection measures based on relative factor returns. The general equilibrium 
methodology allows us to measure the full extent of policy bias, by capturing both di-
rect and indirect consequences of trade distortions. Specifically, our focus on relative 
factor returns allows us to account for changes in intermediate input prices, which 
may well affect relative agricultural price incentives. Accordingly, our methodology 
allows us to employ a, theoretically, appropriate general equilibrium version of the 
classical effective rate of protection measure (GE-ERP).5 
 
Our approach is methodologically in line with the static, single-country, CGE model 
methodology, proposed by Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2002) and Bautista, Robinson, 
Wobst, and Tarp (2001). The implementation of the methodology is based on a “stan-
dard” trade-focused Computable General Equilibrium model (Lofgren et al., 2002).6 
The model is neoclassical in spirit. It is based on profit- and utility-maximizing indi-
viduals, and competitive product and factor markets are cleared by flexible prices and 
factor returns. The extreme dichotomy between tradable and non-tradable goods, 
which is present in the partial equilibrium approach, is softened by assuming varying 
degrees of tradability. This provides a realistic link between world market prices and 
domestic prices of traded goods. 
 
                                                 
5 De Melo and Robinson (1981) and Devarajan and Sussangkarn (1992) describe the use of CGE 
models to measure the effective rate of protection and compare them to partial equilibrium meas-
ures. 
6 The standard model arose from work on a number of country models with an agricultural focus. 
An early example is Arndt, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp (2000). Full details on the current modeling 
methodology can be found in an early working paper version of the current paper (Jensen, Robinson 
and Tarp, 2002). 
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To measure the agricultural policy bias, the CGE model is used to simulate the re-
moval of historical trade policy distortions in section 4.1, and the imposition of ex-
perimental trade policy distortions in section 4.2. If the removal/imposition of a pol-
icy distortion yields a new equilibrium in which the agricultural sector is “better 
off”/“worse off”, the policy distortion is said to generate a bias against agriculture. 
How to measure “better off” is an important issue. The classical choice is to use the 
nominal agricultural value added share as a measure of agricultural policy bias. An 
increase in the agricultural value added share can arise from two sources: (1) an in-
crease in factor use in agriculture relative to non-agriculture, and/or (2) an improve-
ment of factor returns in agriculture relative to non-agriculture. The removal of policy 
distortions will, typically, lead to changes in both prices and quantities. Under such 
circumstances, it is not appropriate to measure agricultural policy bias in terms of a 
relative price index. 
 
The traditional partial equilibrium NPR and ERP measures, which focus, purely, on 
changes in relative prices, abstract from the quantity effects of policy changes, includ-
ing shifts in employment, production, and trade. In particular, no attempt is made to 
measure the ‘price adjustment’-equivalent of the quantity impact of trade distortions. 
In order to ensure that our general equilibrium effective rate of protection (GE-ERP) 
measure is an appropriate measure of policy bias (and, at the same time, remains 
comparable to the partial equilibrium measures), we segment the factor markets in our 
country models so that factors are allowed to move freely within agricultural and non-
agricultural sector groups, but not to move between them. By restricting factor mobil-
ity in this way, agricultural supply response will be limited and adjustment in nominal 
value added shares will be fully reflected in equilibrium prices. With restricted factor 
mobility, our general equilibrium GE-ERP measure will, therefore, provide a theo-
retically appropriate measure of agricultural policy bias. 
 
The current methodology aims to use the CGE model as a measuring instrument 
rather than as a tool for policy analysis. The result is not a “realistic” model, but a 
model that generates a benchmark general equilibrium measure of trade policy-
induced incentive effects. The data sets underlying each of the country models, accu-
rately reflects the economic environment of the specific country, but the behaviour of 
agents and markets is restricted to provide a policy bias measure that reflects the full 
extent of agricultural policy bias in relative equilibrium prices. 
 
Our measurement methodology focuses on relative price incentives. In this way, it 
differs from previous CGE-based studies by World Bank researchers (Anderson et al., 
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2005, 2006a, 2006b). They rely on the dynamic global LINKAGE model framework 
to measure the welfare impact of trade distortions, arguing that the welfare changes 
reflect long-term efficiency gains. However, it is unclear to what extent these “effi-
ciency gains” are due to static welfare gains from changes in relative price incentives, 
and/or to dynamic welfare gains arising from increased capital accumulation due to 
tax-reform induced income re-distribution between agents with different propensities 
to save.7 
 
The analyses of the GE-ERP measure (section 4) will focus on key structural deter-
minants, including relative trade shares and intersectoral linkages, and key general 
equilibrium effects including (i) trade policy-induced exchange rate adjustment, and 
(ii) trade policy and exchange rate induced adjustment in relative input costs (the in-
put cost channel) and marketing margins (the marketing cost channel). We evaluate 
the input cost channel by comparing our GE-ERP measure to a general equilibrium 
version of the nominal protection rate (GE-NPR) measure.8 This comparison also al-
lows us to evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the choice of protection measure. 
 
Finally, our experimental analyses of imposed trade distortions (section 4.2) start 
from a set of simulations, which defines distortion free base economies for our 15 
sample countries. This includes the elimination of indirect taxes and current account 
imbalances. The counterfactual measurement of policy bias, on the basis of distortion 
free base economies, is important, since it allows for the elimination of sample varia-
tion in trade distortions. Accordingly, this allows us to focus on the importance of 
country-specific characteristics for the determination of the GE-ERP policy bias 
measure. 
3. Country Models and Data Sets 
The “standard” trade-focused CGE model framework (see Section 2.2) is used to 
calibrate country-specific models for each of the 15 sample countries, listed in Table 
1. The applications are, necessarily, somewhat stylized to achieve comparability, ne-
glecting country-specific institutional details while capturing country-specific differ-
                                                 
7 Tax reforms may also be associated with long-lived transitory welfare losses. For an example of 
transitory welfare losses associated with labor market tax reform in labor-exporting Middle Eastern 
and Northern African countries, see Agénor, Nabli, Yousef and Jensen (2007). 
8 The GE-NPR measure is defined in terms of relative output prices. 
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ences in economic structure.9 The country models are calibrated on the basis of Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) data sets. All SAM data sets are from the 1990s and in-
clude significant agricultural detail. The sample includes upper middle-income and 
high-income countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Korea, and Mexico, and lower mid-
dle-income and low-income countries such as Costa Rica, Egypt, Indonesia, Malawi, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Tanzania, Tunisia, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The 
sample is geographically dispersed, including five countries from Southern Africa, 
three from Northern Africa, five from Latin America, and two from Asia. There is an 
overlap of six countries with the sample from the Krueger project, and 11 countries 
with the sample from the Anderson project. 
 
Tabel 1. Sample Country Data 
 
 SAM Year --------------------------- SAM Sectors ------------------------- GNP per Capita
C
 
ountry Agriculture
Non-
Agriculture Factors
Marketing 
Margins (US$)
Mozambique 1995 12 27 4 3 80
Tanzania 1992 21 34 7* 3 120
Malawi 1998 7 26 11* 0 170
Zambia 1995 14 14 10* 3 400
Zimbabwe 1991 24 12 9* 3 540
Egypt 1997 13 14 5* 0 790
Indonesia 1995 5 18 23* 3 980
Morocco 1994 31 10 14* 0 1110
Tunisia 1996 2 17 4 3 1820
Costa Rica 1991 5 17 13 0 2610
Mexico 1996 57 14 45* 0 3320
Venezuela 1995 12 40 3 3 3020
Brazil 1995 36 6 39* 0 3640
Argentina 1993 13 31 3 0 8030
Korea 1990 12 28 3 0 9700
 
Source: SAM data from Trade and Macroeconomics Division, International Food Policy Research Institute – 
see references in Jensen, Robinson & Tarp (2002); 1995 GNP per capita data from World Development Re-
port, 1998. 
* Includes land as a factor. 
 
 
The 15 SAM data sets differ in terms of (i) the disaggregation of production sectors, 
(ii) the disaggregation of primary factors of production, and (iii) the inclusion of mar-
keting costs and home consumption of own production. The differences can be 
gauged from Table 1. All data sets account separately for value added by labor and 
capital. In addition, nine out of 15 sample data sets include land as an agriculture-
specific production factor. Nevertheless, in order for our country models to provide a 
                                                 
9 For further details on data sets and country models, including references to CGE-based case stud-
ies for the 15 sample countries, see Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2002). 
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theoretically appropriate measure of agricultural policy bias (see Section 2.2), capital 
was disaggregated into agricultural and non-agricultural capital so as to create agri-
culture-specific production factors in all country models.10 
 
The economic structure of the 15 country models is presented in Table 2. They differ, 
widely, according to the importance of the agricultural sector. Poorer southern Afri-
can countries like Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia are very dependent 
on agricultural production, while middle- and high-income countries like Argentina, 
Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela have relatively small agricultural sectors. Nev-
ertheless, relative trade shares turn out to be more important for the transmission of 
trade distortions to relative domestic prices. Table 2 indicates that agricultural export 
shares are higher than non-agricultural export shares in only five sample countries in-
cluding Argentina, Costa Rica, Malawi, Mexico, and Zimbabwe.  
 
Most developing countries show structural differences between marketing margins for 
agricultural and non-agricultural products. This has important implications for the 
measurement of policy-induced agricultural bias. Seven of the country data sets, in-
cluding Indonesia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Tunesia, Venezuela, Zambia and Zim-
babwe account for marketing margins. In general, services do not incur marketing 
costs. This means that domestic non-agricultural marketing costs are relatively low on 
average. At the same time, small service imports, generally, means that average non-
agricultural marketing costs for imports are relatively high. The structure of market-
ing margin rates, therefore, tends to provide an incentive bias against domestic agri-
cultural production. An increase in the price of marketing services tends to increase 
industrial protection afforded by relatively high industrial import margin rates, and 
reduce agricultural protection due to relatively high agricultural domestic margin 
rates. In this way, marketing margins provides an important example of how intersec-
toral linkages may affect the determination of agricultural policy bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Capital was disaggregated into agricultural and non-agricultural capital in all country models, 
while labour remains mobile between sectors in most of the country models. 
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Table 2. General Characteristics of Country Models 
 
 -------------- Composition (percent) ------------ Trade Ratios (percent)
 
 VA X E M E/X M/Q
 
Argentina Agriculture 5.5 4.1 16.6 1.2 14.4 1.7
  Industry 15.3 25.3 66.8 66.7 9.4 13.4
  Services 79.3 70.6 16.6 32.1 0.8 2.1
Brazil Agriculture 9.5 7.7 5.3 4.4 2.5 2.6
  Industry 26.4 43.6 81.9 80.7 6.9 8.8
  Services 64.1 48.7 12.8 14.9 1.0 1.3
Costa Rica Agriculture 13.2 16.3 31.8 16.1 45.9 33.7
  Industry 18.5 32.6 37.9 65.9 27.9 44.0
  Services 68.3 51.1 30.3 18.0 13.9 9.9
Egypt Agriculture 17.7 14.1 0.5 9.5 0.5 9.6
  Industry 24.7 36.9 37.7 77.3 12.9 28.3
  Services 57.6 49.0 61.8 13.2 15.9 4.3
Indonesia Agriculture 18.4 12.8 2.1 2.9 1.7 2.9
  Industry 30.1 39.9 82.9 78.4 23.2 27.2
  Services 51.4 47.3 15.0 18.8 4.0 5.1
Korea Agriculture 8.8 5.0 1.6 7.0 4.1 17.7
  Industry 30.1 50.2 79.6 85.3 20.3 23.0
  Services 61.1 44.8 18.8 7.7 5.4 2.3
Malawi Agriculture 35.9 29.6 68.8 7.8 44.1 10.7
  Industry 16.1 31.4 13.6 65.7 8.2 38.4
  Services 48.0 38.9 17.7 26.5 8.7 15.8
Mexico Agriculture 6.4 5.3 8.5 6.9 30.3 25.7
  Industry 22.4 38.0 91.5 93.1 45.7 44.6
  Services 71.2 56.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Morocco Agriculture 19.2 13.1 8.1 5.6 7.0 14.3
  Industry 24.3 38.5 51.2 75.7 15.2 29.8
  Services 56.6 48.4 40.8 18.7 9.6 5.6
Mozambique Agriculture 25.9 16.6 4.9 6.0 2.3 22.2
  Industry 10.4 15.6 43.0 75.7 27.6 67.3
  Services 63.7 67.8 52.1 18.4 9.1 8.4
Tanzania Agriculture 38.6 27.0 25.6 1.4 4.7 1.4
  Industry 13.3 25.3 30.5 83.5 5.4 44.1
  Services 48.1 47.8 43.9 15.1 5.3 6.1
Tunisia Agriculture 14.8 9.8 1.2 4.4 1.9 9.6
  Industry 22.4 43.4 67.1 88.2 35.2 45.4
  Services 62.9 46.9 31.7 7.5 16.0 4.5
Venezuela Agriculture 4.5 4.1 0.4 4.8 1.2 15.3
  Industry 41.4 46.3 93.2 70.1 44.3 29.5
  Services 54.1 49.6 6.5 25.1 3.0 6.5
Zambia Agriculture 28.5 21.8 6.4 4.6 4.5 8.8
  Industry 29.2 33.6 85.7 73.7 40.3 47.1
  Services 42.3 44.6 7.9 21.8 2.5 10.9
Zimbabwe Agriculture 15.3 13.6 41.9 0.6 36.1 1.6
  Industry 31.7 36.8 35.5 93.8 11.8 37.3
  Services 53.1 49.6 22.6 5.6 6.6 2.2
 
NOTE: VA – Value Added, E – Exports, X – Production, M – Imports, Q – Demand. 
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Turning to the structure of indirect taxes and tariffs, export taxes are virtually non-
existent while import tariff rates, generally, vary in the range between 0-25 percent. 
Industrial tariff rates are higher than agricultural tariff rates, with a few major excep-
tions (Korea, Morocco, and Venezuela). Furthermore, tariff rates are, generally, 
higher than domestic indirect tax rates. Production taxes do not, consistently, favor 
any particular sector, while consumption taxes, generally, are lower for agricultural 
goods. 
4. Simulation Results 
This section presents two sets of simulations where we apply our country-specific 
CGE models to derive general equilibrium effective rate of protection (GE-ERP) 
measures of agricultural policy bias. In section 4.1, we measure the historical varia-
tion of protection rates which arise from existing price distortions, including indirect 
tax and tariff structures. Subsequently, in Section 4.2, we measure the experimental 
variation in protection rates which arises from imposing standard trade distortions, 
including non-agricultural import tariffs and overvalued exchange rates, on non-
distorted base economies.11 
 
All simulations are carried out using a balanced macro closure in which aggregate in-
vestment is specified as a fixed share of total absorption. This simple macro closure 
assumes no major swings in macro aggregates in response to external shocks, and 
maintains focus on the key issues of modeling methodology, tradability assumptions, 
country-specific characteristics, and the choice of protection measure. To keep in-
vestment fixed as a share of nominal absorption, household savings rates are assumed 
to vary proportionately. Furthermore, in line with the public finance literature, all 
simulations are carried out using a revenue-neutral specification of the government 
budget. In order to fix government revenue, household tax rates are allowed to vary 
proportionately. The factor market closure specifies full employment of available fac-
tor supplies. Finally, all simulations are carried out using a flexible real exchange rate 
and fixed foreign savings inflows, except for the experimental exchange rate simula-
tions in Section 4.2.2, where the impact of a pre-set level of exchange rate apprecia-
tion is analyzed. 
 
                                                 
11 The choice of trade distortions is motivated by traditional Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) strategies, and they are specified along the lines of the single country-studies in Jensen and 
Tarp (2002) and Bautista et al. (2001). For an extended analysis including experimental simulations 
of agricultural export taxes, see Jensen, Robinson & Tarp (2002). 
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Imperfect tradability is a key feature of the trade-focused CGE model framework em-
ployed in this study. The specification of trade elasticities is, therefore, a central fea-
ture of the model specification. In order to increase comparability among country 
models, similar agricultural and non-agricultural trade elasticity levels are imposed on 
all country models. Furthermore, in order to increase comparability with historical 
partial equilibrium studies, we impose a relatively high agricultural trade elasticity 
(1.8) and a relatively low non-agricultural trade elasticity (0.6). Monte Carlo simula-
tions are undertaken in Section 4.2, to investigate the robustness of the GE-ERP ef-
fective protection measure with respect to variation in relative trade elasticity levels.12 
4.1. Historical Variation in Policy Bias during the 1990s 
The first set of simulations is used to measure the historical variation of agricultural 
bias which arise from existing trade distortions, including indirect tax and tariff struc-
tures, in our SAM data sets from the 1990s. The indirect tax and tariff simulations in-
clude a base run and four alternative simulations to measure the cumulative impact of 
eliminating production taxes (TA), consumption taxes (TQ), export taxes (TE), and 
import tariffs (TM). Results for our GE-ERP protection measure are presented in Ta-
ble 3.13 
 
The experiments indicate that trade distortions, in the form of indirect taxes and tar-
iffs, significantly discriminated against agriculture in only one country (Malawi), 
were largely neutral in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Indonesia, and 
Zimbabwe), provided a moderate subsidy to agriculture in five countries (Egypt, 
Mexico, Tanzania, Venezuela, and Zambia), and strongly favored agriculture in four 
countries (Korea, Morocco, Mozambique, and Tunisia).  
 
At one extreme, Malawi is the only sample country where indirect taxes and tariffs 
discriminated, significantly, against agriculture. Malawi is a small, poor, densely 
populated country where consumption taxes, derived from processed food, account 
for the major share of domestic indirect tax revenues. Table 3 indicates that these 
consumption taxes represent the main source of bias against agriculture in Malawi. 
Furthermore, the effective protection index (GE-ERP = 107.2) is higher than the 
nominal index (GE-NPR = 105.5). Hence, Malawi is the only sample country where 
the input cost channel works in favor of the non-agricultural sector. 
                                                 
12 To save space, we only report results from the Monte Carlo simulations based on non-agricultural 
tariff experiments. 
13 In table 5, countries are grouped according to structural characteristics discussed below. 
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Table 3. Relative Agricultural Protection (GE-ERP) in the 1990s  
(Historical Indirect Tax Simulations) 
 
  Base Run Sim. 1 Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim. 4
  (INDEX) (TA) (TQ) (TE) (TM)
 
Malawi 100.0 100.0 106.3 106.5 107.2
Zimbabwe 100.0 99.2 99.2 99.2 104.2
Argentina 100.0 99.6 98.8 98.8 102.0
Brazil 100.0 97.0 97.0 97.0 98.0
Costa Rica 100.0 97.7 96.0 91.2 96.6
Mexico 100.0 95.4 94.4 94.4 94.3
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 98.9 98.9 97.0
Tanzania 100.0 97.5 94.3 94.3 92.6
Zambia 100.0 96.5 94.5 94.5 92.4
Mozambique 100.0 99.7 92.1 92.1 88.0
Egypt 100.0 99.1 95.5 95.5 91.6
Venezuela 100.0 98.9 93.6 93.6 90.9
Tunisia 100.0 99.7 93.2 93.2 89.1
Korea 100.0 84.7 84.7 84.7 82.2
Morocco 100.0 93.9 90.7 90.7 78.4
 
NOTE: The elimination of indirect taxes is measured additively. Simulation 1 represents the elimination of 
taxes on Production (TA), while Simulation 4 represents the elimination of all taxes on Production (TA), Con-
sumption (TQ), Exports (TE), and Imports (TM). 
 
 
At the other extreme, Morocco is the sample country where indirect taxes and tariffs 
discriminated, most strongly, in favor of agriculture. Table 3 demonstrates that the 
entire Moroccan tax structure, including production and consumption taxes, but espe-
cially import tariffs, contributes to biasing price incentives in favor of agricultural 
production. A highly dispersed tariff structure with high import tariffs on both agri-
cultural imports, e.g. wheat and livestock, and manufactured imports, is protecting 
agricultural production and taxing manufacturing sectors by increasing their input 
costs. Incidentally, Morocco is the sample country (together with Korea) where the 
input cost channel works most strongly in favor of the agricultural sector.14 
 
Among the remaining 13 countries, three groups with broadly similar characteristics 
can be outlined. The first group (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Zimbabwe) has 
indirect tax structures that are relatively neutral with respect to relative price incen-
tives.  Argentina and Brazil are upper middle-income countries with developed and 
competitive agricultural sectors, specialized in livestock and cash crops, while the 
                                                 
14 Nominal and effective protection index measurements for Morocco (GE-ERP = 78.4; GE-NPR = 
92.6) and Korea (GE-ERP = 82.2; GE-NPR = 99.4) indicates that the input cost structure strongly 
reinforces effective agricultural protection in these countries. 
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other two, Zimbabwe and Costa Rica, have competitive agricultural export sectors 
based on large-scale commercial farming and specialized in the production of cash 
crops, such as tobacco and cotton in the case of Zimbabwe. In spite of the relatively 
developed nature of agricultural (export) sectors, taxation of agricultural production 
remains relatively moderate. In general, domestic indirect taxes tend to support rela-
tive agricultural price incentives, while import tariffs tend to protect non-agricultural 
production among this group of countries. 
 
Brazil represents a special case, since the effective protection index (GE-ERP = 98.0) 
and the nominal index (GE-NPR = 105.4) suggest different signs for the policy-
induced price incentive bias. The elimination of production taxes, by itself, yields an 
effective protection index of GE-ERP = 97.0 and a nominal index of GE-NPR = 
104.7. It follows that the Brazilian (production) tax structure at the same time creates 
nominal protection for the non-agricultural sector, and effective protection for the ag-
ricultural sector. This result demonstrates that the input cost channel plays a key role 
in measuring the size – and potentially the sign – of policy-induced price incentive 
bias, and it highlights that the choice of protection measure is not irrelevant. 
 
The second group of countries consists of Indonesia and three poorer southern Afri-
can countries, including Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. They can be character-
ized as low-income countries with relatively large and underdeveloped agricultural 
sectors. Trade in agricultural goods is generally low. As a consequence, taxation of 
non-agricultural production and imports is the only viable means of raising indirect 
tax revenue in these countries. Since agricultural production technologies are very ru-
dimentary while non-agricultural production technologies are more input-intensive, 
this tends to lower non-agricultural price incentives by increasing intermediate input 
costs. Table 3 demonstrates that the tax structure of these countries tends to discrimi-
nate against non-agricultural production at all levels. The implicit level of agricultural 
protection ranges from three percent in Indonesia, to 7-12 percent in the three south-
ern African countries. 
 
The third group of countries, including Egypt, Venezuela, Tunisia, and Korea are, like 
Morocco, characterized by relatively small agricultural sectors that are insufficient to 
feed their populations. In order to maintain some level of self-sufficiency, these coun-
tries tend to impose tax-structures that favor agricultural production. While Morocco 
relies strongly on agricultural import tariffs (e.g. to protect production of soft wheat), 
Korea relies more heavily on domestic differences between non-agricultural taxation 
and agricultural subsidization to generate price incentives in favor of agriculture (e.g. 
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rice). The overall level of agricultural protection varies from nine percent in Vene-
zuela and 18 percent in Korea, to between 8 and 32 percent in the northern African 
group of countries. 
 
Finally, Mexico stands out as the country where import tariffs have the smallest effect 
on relative price incentives. While Mexico has one of the most open economies in the 
sample, it maintains a relatively balanced trade account in both agricultural and non-
agricultural goods, as well as a relatively uniform and non-distorting structure of im-
port tariffs. Accordingly, the Mexican indirect tax structure resembles that of Korea: 
The main policy bias arise from domestic differences between non-agricultural taxes 
and (small) agricultural subsidies. This results in an overall level of agricultural price 
support of six percent. 
 
To summarize, there are little signs of indirect tax and tariff policy induced agricul-
tural bias among our sample countries. This indicates that the historical trade policy 
bias against agriculture was largely eliminated during the 1990s.15 The results also 
indicate that the input cost channel work in favor of the agricultural sector in all coun-
tries (except Malawi), and that it may account for more than 90 percent of total effec-
tive protection (e.g. Korea). It follows that the use of nominal protection measure-
ments would seriously underestimate actual effective rates of protection, and in one 
case (Brazil) lead to a spurious bias against the agricultural sector. 
 
4.2. Experimental Variation in Policy Bias 
In this section, we measure the experimental variation in policy bias by imposing 
standard trade distortions, including non-agricultural import tariffs and overvalued 
exchange rates, on non-distorted base economies. As explained in section 2.2, the use 
of non-distorted base economies eliminates the sample variation in trade distortions, 
and, focuses attention on the importance of country-specific characteristics for the de-
termination of the GE-ERP policy bias measure. We investigate the impact of a uni-
form 25 percent non-agricultural import tariff in section 4.2.1, and the impact of a 10 
percent exchange rate appreciation in section 4.2.2. Furthermore, we apply a Monte 
                                                 
15 An empirical analysis of exchange rate overvaluation (not shown) is necessary to fully capture the 
direction and extent of the price incentive bias in our sample countries. The precise definition and 
measurement of a sustainable external deficit is a contentious issue. However, regardless of the 
choice of sustainable upper bound for the external deficit, most countries in our sample show no 
signs of agricultural bias in the 1990s. For further details, see Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2002). 
Measuring Agricultural Policy Bias   FOI    19 
Carlo procedure in section 4.2.3, to investigate the robustness of our results with re-
spect to underlying tradability assumptions. 
4.2.1. Non-Agricultural Import Tariffs 
The first policy simulation is a uniform 25 percent tariff on non-agricultural imports. 
The results for the 15 sample countries are presented in Figure 1, and they indicate 
that non-agricultural import tariffs, on balance, tend to increase the GE-ERP measure 
of agricultural protection. This result may seem counter-intuitive at first sight. Never-
theless, it is an indication that strong general equilibrium effects reverse the partial 
equilibrium based nominal protection impact of non-agricultural import tariffs. Key 
general equilibrium effects include (i) tariff-induced exchange rate adjustment, and 
(ii) tariff and exchange rate induced adjustment in relative input cost structures and 
marketing margins. 
 
Figure 1. GE-ERP and Relative Trade Shares  
(25 Percent Non-Agricultural Import Tariff Experiments) 
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While the uniform non-agricultural import tariff, on balance, tends to increase agri-
cultural protection, the individual country impact varies between 15 percent agricul-
tural protection (Tunisia), and 13 percent non-agricultural protection (Costa Rica). 
Two main groups of countries may be identified. The first group, including Argen-
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tina, Costa Rica, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, consists of countries with high relative ag-
ricultural trade shares where agricultural protection declines. The second group, in-
cluding Egypt, Indonesia, Korea Mozambique, Tanzania, Tunisia, Venezuela, and 
Zambia, consists of countries with low relative agricultural trade shares where agri-
cultural protection increases. Three countries, including Brazil, Mexico, and Mo-
rocco, fall outside the two main groups. 
 
The characteristics of the two main groups demonstrate that the GE-ERP impact is 
negatively related to the relative agricultural trade share.16 This relationship points to 
the importance of accompanying tariff-induced exchange rate appreciation, which 
tends to worsen relative price incentives for the types of goods that are traded most 
intensely. The real exchange rate appreciates by 4-10 percent in all cases, but leads to 
very different results in the two main groups. In the group with high relative agricul-
tural trade shares, the tariff protection induces an average 7.7 percent exchange rate 
appreciation, and this contributes to an average 7.1 percent decline in effective agri-
cultural protection. In the group with low relative agricultural trade shares, an average 
6.1 percent exchange rate appreciation contributes to an average 5.6 percent increase 
in effective agricultural protection. These results indicate that general equilibrium ef-
fects, in the form of tariff-induced exchange rate adjustment, play a crucial role for 
measuring the relative size and sign of the trade policy bias for individual sample 
countries. 
 
The importance of intersectoral linkages can be evaluated by comparing the GE-ERP 
results in Figure 1 with the GE-NPR results in Figure 2. The results demonstrate that 
the input cost channel is very important in the transmission of non-agricultural import 
tariffs. The GE-NPR measure, generally, underestimates effective agricultural protec-
tion among countries with low relative agricultural trade shares (avg. GE-NPR=1.5 
percent; avg. GE-ERP = 5.6 percent), while it underestimates effective non-
agricultural protection among countries with high relative agricultural trade shares 
(avg. GE-NPR=-5.0 percent; avg. GE-ERP=-7.1 percent). It follows that the input 
cost channel accounts for an average 4.1 percentage points (or 73 percent) of effective 
agricultural protection among countries with low relative agricultural trade shares, 
                                                 
16 The relative agricultural trade share is defined as the ratio of agricultural versus non-agricultural 
trade shares. A trade share ratio of one indicates that the initial trade share in agriculture (agricul-
tural imports plus agricultural exports divided by agricultural GDP) is the same as in non-
agriculture. An index greater than one indicates a higher trade share for agriculture compared to 
non-agriculture. 
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and an average 2.1 percentage points (or 29 percent) of effective non-agricultural pro-
tection among countries with high relative agricultural trade shares. 
 
Figure 2. GE-NPR and Relative Trade Shares  
(25 Percent Non-Agricultural Import Tariff Experiments) 
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These results suggest that the input cost channel work for the agricultural sector in 
countries with low relative agricultural trade shares and against the agricultural sector 
in countries with high relative agricultural trade shares. However, this conclusion 
does not stand up to closer scrutiny. A closer examination of Figures 1-2 shows that 
the input cost channel, generally, works in favor of agricultural price incentives, re-
gardless of relative trade shares.17 Nevertheless, the results also indicate that the input 
cost channel is more favorable for agriculture in countries with low relative agricul-
tural trade shares, i.e. countries where trade consists – to a large extent – of imported 
intermediate goods. 
 
The results also indicate that the marketing cost channel plays an important role for 
the transmission of non-agricultural tariffs to the domestic price system. Marketing 
costs are accounted for in seven country models, and the price of marketing services 
declines in all cases (due to reduced demand for transportation of traded goods). As 
                                                 
17 Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica are the only countries where the input cost channel work mark-
edly in favour of the non-agricultural sector. The reason is that local agricultural production is rela-
tively intensive in imported non-agricultural inputs such as fossil fuels, chemicals, and other indus-
trial products. 
22    FOI    Measuring Agricultural Policy Bias 
explained in Section 3, reduced marketing costs tend to increase relative agricultural 
price incentives. The results indicate that the three countries with the largest increase 
in effective agricultural protection – Indonesia, Mozambique, and Tunisia – experi-
ence an average 7.9 percent reduction in marketing costs. 
 
Overall, the results demonstrate the key importance of accounting for country-specific 
characteristics and general equilibrium effects in measuring the relative size and sign 
of tariff-induced policy bias. This has important implications. The existence of large 
general equilibrium effects and the importance of intersectoral linkages mean that it is 
crucial to use the GE-ERP measure for the evaluation of agricultural policy bias. The 
GE-NPR measure (as well as the classical NPR measure based on partial equilibrium 
analysis) does not provide a satisfactory measure of effective agricultural protection. 
4.2.2. Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
In this section, we investigate the effective agricultural protection impact of a 10 per-
cent real exchange rate appreciation.18 The results are presented in Figure 3 and they 
indicate that there exists a strong negative relationship between the GE-ERP measure 
of agricultural protection and relative agricultural trade shares. This mirrors the re-
sults from the previous section. Again, two major groups of countries may be identi-
fied. The first group (Argentina, Costa Rica, Malawi, Mexico, and Zimbabwe) con-
sists of countries with high relative agricultural trade shares where agricultural protec-
tion declines. The second group (Egypt, Korea, Indonesia, Tanzania, Tunisia, and 
Venezuela) consists of countries with low relative agricultural trade shares where ag-
ricultural protection increases. Four countries (Brazil, Morocco, Mozambique, and 
Zambia) do not fall into either of the two main groups. 
 
Among the first group of countries with relatively large agricultural trade shares, the 
GE-ERP impact for Argentina, Malawi, and Zimbabwe is dominated by reduced 
terms-of-trade for agricultural exports. Reduced protection for import-competing ag-
ricultural products further adds to declining agricultural price incentives in Costa Rica 
and Mexico. Among the second group of countries with relatively small agricultural 
trade shares, several countries are net-importers of agricultural goods. The exchange 
rate appreciation induces disprotection for agricultural crops in these countries. Nev-
ertheless, this effect is, in all cases, dominated by the combined impact of (i) declin-
                                                 
18 The variation in base run trade shares leads to a strongly heterogenous current account impact 
among the 15 sample countries. However, this has little importance for relative price incentives, 
since we employ a balanced macro closure. For further details, see Jensen, Robinson & Tarp (2002). 
Measuring Agricultural Policy Bias   FOI    23 
ing terms-of-trade for exports of non-agricultural goods and (tourist) services, and (ii) 
disprotection of import-competing non-agricultural production. 
 
Figure 3. GE-ERP and Relative Trade Shares  
(10 Percent Exchange Rate Overvaluation) 
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The results illustrate how the relative agricultural protection impact of exchange rate 
appreciation depends crucially on the size of relative trade shares. In addition, the im-
portance of general equilibrium effects – working through the marketing cost channel 
– can be judged by comparing the results of Zambia and Tunisia. Trade shares are 
similar, but relative agricultural price incentives increase particularly strongly in Tu-
nisia. The reason is that the price of marketing services increases in Zambia (not 
shown), while it declines in Tunisia to the benefit of Tunisian agriculture. 
 
In order to further study the importance of intersectoral linkages, Figure 4 presents the 
impact of the 10 percent exchange rate appreciation on the GE-NPR measure. In line 
with the import tariff simulations, the GE-NPR measure tends to underestimate effec-
tive non-agricultural protection among countries with high relative agricultural trade 
shares (average GE-NPR = -9.6 percent; average GE-ERP = -16.3 percent). However, 
in contrast to the import tariff simulations, the GE-NPR measure tends to be fairly ac-
curate, when it comes to effective agricultural protection among countries with low 
relative agricultural trade shares (average GE-NPR = 2.7 percent; average GE-ERP = 
2.6 percent). In the case of exchange rate appreciation, the input cost channel is there-
fore, mainly, important among sample countries where (i) agricultural (export) trade 
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shares are relatively high, and (ii) agricultural production makes intensive use of non-
agricultural production inputs. 
 
Figure 4. GE-NPR and Relative Trade Shares  
(10 Percent Exchange Rate Overvaluation) 
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The results of the exchange rate simulations put further perspective on the transmis-
sion of non-agricultural tariffs to the domestic price system. The results indicate that 
exchange rate changes – whether imposed exogenously or induced by other trade 
policies – mainly works through their impact on nominal protection in goods sectors 
with high relative trade shares. The main exception is sample countries with high ag-
ricultural (export) trade shares and (partly) developed agricultural production prac-
tices. In these countries, the input cost channel work as an important additional 
transmission mechanism for exchange rate appreciation, in favor of the non-
agricultural sector. 
 
Overall, the exchange rate simulations confirm the conclusion from the non-
agricultural tariff simulations: Trade policy may lead to increased agricultural or non-
agricultural protection depending on the country-specific context. Furthermore, the 
results confirm that general equilibrium effects, working through the input cost and 
marketing cost channels, are important in order to fully capture the protective impact 
of trade policies. It follows that proper measurement of trade policy-induced agricul-
tural policy bias requires the use of the GE-ERP protection measure. 
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4.2.3. Monte Carlo Simulations 
The results of the experimental simulations indicate that non-agricultural tariffs and 
exchange rate overvaluation may reduce or increase agricultural protection rates de-
pending on whether relative agricultural trade shares are greater or smaller than one. 
However, due to the assumption of imperfect tradability, the results could, potentially, 
depend on the choice of relative trade elasticities. It is therefore important to investi-
gate the extent to which the choice of trade elasticities affects the sign and size of the 
impact of trade policies on the GE-ERP measure. A set of robustness checks was un-
dertaken to look into this question. Results are reported for the non-agricultural im-
port tariff experiments.19 
 
Following Abler, Rodriguez and Shortle (1999), we employ a Monte Carlo procedure 
to investigate the sensitivity of our GE-ERP results with respect to variations in trade 
elasticities. The procedure was based on 1000 sets of independent draws of uniform 
agricultural and non-agricultural trade elasticities from a rectangular distribution over 
the interval [0.5; 2.0]. The number of independent draws ensures that, for each sample 
country, the average point estimate is estimated with a precision of 0.1 percentage 
points at the usual 5 percent confidence level.20 Each set of trade elasticities consists 
of one uniform agricultural trade elasticity and one uniform non-agricultural trade 
elasticity. Moreover, for each set of trade elasticities, the country model in focus was 
re-calibrated and subjected to the uniform 25 percent non-agricultural import tariff 
experiment. Detailed results for the 15 sample countries are given in Figure 5. 
 
The results show that average protection rates vary between -14.6 percent (Costa 
Rica) and +16.6 percent (Tunisia). Altogether, 10 countries have point estimates 
which are significantly above 0, while five countries have point estimates that are sig-
nificantly below 0. This mirrors the results from section 4.2.1, where non-agricultural 
import tariffs gave rise to agricultural protection in nine countries, and non-
agricultural protection in six countries. Generally, the results indicate that the non-
agricultural import tariffs may lead to anything between 16 percent non-agricultural 
protection (Costa Rica), and 19 percent agricultural protection (Tunisia). Again, this 
mirrors the results from section 4.2.1, where the tariff-induced policy bias varied be-
                                                 
19 Monte Carlo simulations for the exchange rate appreciation experiments gave, qualitatively, simi-
lar results. 
20 The number of independent draws, needed to achieve a precision of 0.1 percentage points for the 
average point estimate, varied between 45 draws in the case of Mexico and 919 draws in the case of 
Morocco. 
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tween 13 percent non-agricultural protection (Costa Rica), and 15 percent agricul-
tural protection (Tunisia). 
 
Figure 5. Sensitivity of GE-ERP in sample Countries: Variation in Trade Elastic-
ities (25 percent Non-Agricultural Import Tariff Experiment) 
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Note: The sensitivity analysis was based on 1000 simulations for each single-country model. Uniform agricul-
tural and non-agricultural trade elasticities were in each case drawn from a uniform distribution with a basis of 
[0.5; 2.0]. All simulations were measured relative to a distortion free base run, which included the elimination 
of indirect taxes and current account deficits and surpluses. The only exception from this rule was Mozam-
bique, where the current account deficit amounted to 18.9 percent of total absorption, and where the base 
run only included the elimination of indirect taxes. 
 
 
 
The results from the Monte Carlo procedure confirm that our conclusions are robust 
to variation in relative trade elasticities. Average GE-ERP point estimates vary 
strongly among sample countries. This confirms that country-specific characteristics – 
including relative trade shares and intersectoral linkages – play a crucial role in de-
termining the size and sign of trade policy-induced price incentive bias. Furthermore, 
the sign of country-specific point estimates is independent of the variation in trade 
elasticities in all but a few cases. Sign variation only occurs for three countries (in-
cluding Morocco, Zambia and Mexico), and size variation typically lies within a 3-5 
percentage point range. This indicates that trade elasticities have only a minor impact 
on the size of relative price effects, and that country-specific analyses are likely to 
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provide reliable point estimates, even when uncertainty surrounds relative trade elas-
ticity estimates. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that the measurement issue is the key issue in the litera-
ture on trade policy-induced agricultural price incentive bias. Historically, large-scale 
World Bank projects have used a single-country partial equilibrium approach to 
measure nominal protection rates. At the same time, World Bank researchers have ac-
knowledged that effective rate of protection measures are more appropriate (Krueger, 
Schiff & Valdes, 1988), and that it is important to capture the general equilibrium ef-
fects of trade distortions (Anderson et al., 2008). We combine these ideas in the de-
velopment of our general equilibrium approach to measuring agricultural policy bias. 
 
Based on a sample data set of Social Accounting Matrices from the 1990s, we cali-
brated 15 country models to undertake historical and experimental simulations. Our 
historical simulations demonstrated that the economy-wide system of indirect taxes 
significantly discriminated against agriculture in only one country, was largely neutral 
in five countries, provided a moderate subsidy to agriculture in four countries, and 
strongly favored agriculture in five countries. Our results, therefore, support the pre-
vailing understanding that the agricultural price incentive bias, which was generally 
perceived to characterize developing countries during the 1980s, was largely elimi-
nated during the 1990s. 
 
Our experimental simulations showed that traditional trade policies affect relative 
price incentives in strongly divergent directions, and that country-specific characteris-
tics – including relative trade shares and intersectoral linkages – are crucial for deter-
mining the size and magnitude of the policy bias. Furthermore, a Monte Carlo proce-
dure confirmed that our conclusions are robust to underlying tradability assumptions. 
The results showed that variation in trade elasticities has little qualitative and quanti-
tative impact on our results. This implies that country-specific analyses are likely to 
provide reliable point estimates, even when uncertainty surrounds relative trade elas-
ticity estimates. 
 
Finally, our analyses demonstrated that the choice of protection measure is crucial. 
General equilibrium price effects – transmitted through input and marketing cost 
structures – account for a large part of the policy bias. It follows that the GE-NPR 
nominal protection measure (as well as the classical NPR measure based on partial 
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equilibrium analysis) does not fully capture the protective impact of traditional trade 
policies. Instead, proper measurement of the price incentive bias requires the use of 
the general equilibrium effective rate of protection GE-ERP measure. 
 
Overall, we find that the size and the sign of the GE-ERP measure vary strongly 
across countries depending on country-specific characteristics. This implies that there 
are no simple rules of thumb regarding the impact of trade policy reform on relative 
agricultural price incentives. Country-specific analysis is, in each case, required to 
determine the policy bias. Similarly, assessment of the need for complementary do-
mestic redistributive policy initiatives (in relation to unilateral trade reform) or com-
pensating measures (in relation to multilateral trade reform) will need to be done on a 
country-by-country basis. 
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